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THE  EUROPEAN  DIMENSION  OF  GERMAN  EXTERNAL  ECONOMIC  RELATIONS 
I  should like to thank you for your kind invitation for me  to come  a:nd 
talk to you this evening about problems connected with the European Community 
and  German  foreign trade.  I  am  particularly grateful for the opportunity 
because this is the first major public speech I'have made  since I  took up my 
post  as Kember  of the  Commission of the European Communi ties. 
Therefore,  I  hope you will understand if I  do  not  leave out the political 
and  longer-term aspects of the subject.  You  are entitled, precisely when 
the European and  world economies  are going through a  difficult phase,  to an 
open discussion about  the overall economic  situation and the medium-term 
prospects for the economic  unification of Europe - a.nd1  hence,  about  the 
general conditions in which your members'  business activities will be 
conducted. -2-
The  historical whys  and wherefores of the European  Community's  foundation 
are well known.  So  are its successes since 1958  - successes in which trade 
has plqed such an important part.  The  volume  of trade within Europe,  which 
is conducted according to Community rules, has  expanded to over twenty times 
the 19 58  level at current  v~ues.  Even if enlargement is taken into 
consideration here,  the expansion of trade within the Community  has been 
far more  dynamic  than the develcfi>ment  of world trade, without it being at 
the latter's expense. 
For the European Community's position in world trade has become  considerably 
more  important  since 1958. 
At  the end of the  seventies the Community  countries accounted for around  36~ 
of world trade  (including internal trade), that is twice as much  as the 
United States  and  four times as much  as Japan. 
Even  when  we  ignore internal trade and take the Community  as  a  single entity 
on t.he  world market,  its share of world trade is abo1,1.t  equal to that of the 
USA  and Japan together - 23%1  as against  16%  for the USA  and  9%  for Japan. 
The  Federal Republic of Germany  has  pl~ed a  considerable part in this 
development • 
Nearly half of total German  import  and  export trade is now  conducted with 
the Community  - that is over  10%  of GDP;  the share was  barely one third in 
1958· 
For years now,  France  and the Netherlands have been by far our biggest 
trading partners as regards both exports and impor-ts;  each of these Member  States 
accounts for over  10%  of total trade. 
• • 
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There has  also been a  noticeable increase in the concentration of iuvestment 
in the Community. 
Germany's direct investments in Community  countries progressed to DM  17  000 X 
in 19781  thus nearly attaining the level of investments in all other 
industrialized countries.  This is still nearly three times the figure of the 
German  economy's direct investments in the United states, which,  as you know, 
has been particularly attractive over the last few years because of the weakness 
of the dollar  • 
The  degree of interdependence is now  such that, under normal political 
circumstances,  even sceptics must  admit it is practically irreversible.  The 
social cost of withdrawal from  the European Community  would now  be so high for 
everyone that any democratic government  would  sooner or later p~  for  such an 
attempt with its own  collapse. 
This  even applies to the United Kingdom,  where the recent controversy about 
membership  of the Community  has reached particularly massive proportions, 
obviously because of a  pure lack of information.  In a:ny case, the real situation 
can be seen from  the figures referred to recently in the Bouse  of Commons  by  . 
Xr Pym,  illustrating where  British interests lie. 
There are already two  and  a  qu.arter million jobs in the United Killgdom  that 
depend on the European Community  - and these would be lost if Britain were 
to withdraw. 
United Kingdom  exports to the Community  countries have grown twice as fast 
since accession as those to other countries - they account  for  4.3%,  compared 
with the 1973  pre-accession figures of 30%• 
One  of the Community's Member  states - namely the Federal Republic of Germa.ny  -
has recently supplanted the United States as the United Kingdom's  largest export 
market. 
According to Mr  Pym,  membership  has made  the country more  attractive for 
foreign investors; the United Killgdom  now  accounts for over half the 
United States' non-oil investment. -4-
The  common  agricultural policy has  also contributed largely towards this 
intfrdependence.  The  system behind it is better than its write-up in the 
press.  The  fact that it has turned out to be too  expensive has less to 
do  with the system itself' than with the policy that has been formulated on 
the basis of it - alwqs with the consent of the Finance Ministers,  by the 
w~.  For it has  also helped keep under control the enormous  change  in 
agricultural structures,  above all in the Medi terra.nea.n area, without its 
having aqy runawq economic  or social effects.  It now  needs to be a4apted 
to changed circumstances - but in a  natural wq and  not in a  piecemeal 
fashion.  One  of the changes is the forthcoming accession of'  Spain and Portugal, 
but  also the realization that there will be twice as  many  people in this 
world by the  end of the century as there were  when the 'lrea.ties of Rome  were 
being negotiated and when  the Stresa Conference took place.  Hence it is 
obvious what  the consequences  are going to be for equilibrium on the world 
market  8lld  what  the price trend for agricultural produce is going to be. 
In this present policy phase of agricultural embargoes  no-one can deD3'  that 
world trade in agricultural produce has become  a  political issue.  It could 
become  as  explosive as that of world trade in oil and  other fossil fUels. 
According to FAO  estimates,  the grain shortfall in the developing countriea 
will amount  to 100 M to 120 M totmes  by the end of the eighties  ;  and 
agricultural production in the developing countries would have to increase 
by  4%  - instead of the present  2.9% - per annum  by the year 2000 in order 
to cover  just basic requirements.  This is just to show that,  when  we  are 
judging agricultural policy,  we  should not  limit our considerations to the 
short-term and  purely EUropean aspects. -5-
In my opinion there is not much  point in mourning over alternative Earopean 
agricultural policies which were theoretically possible in 1958  and.  perhaps 
even corresponded to the letter of the Trea.t;y.  At  no  time were  azq other 
solutions poll  tically possible than those a.ctua.ll;y adopted. 
Another positive achievement is the effect the European Community  has had 
on liberalizing world trade.  The  Dillon,  Kennedy  a.nd  now  the Toqo  Rounds 
would not have been a.s"  successful without it a.nd  the result is that external 
tariffs have lost a.  lot of significance as instruments of protection and 
barriers to world trade. 
The  Communi t;y'  s  external tariff protection is now  lover - some  8%  to 9% -
than tha.t  of its biggest competitors,  the United States and.  Japan. ---------------------------------------
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With the Lome  Comention the Community  made  the largest constructive contribution 
on the part of the industrialized countries to the developnent of trade 
relations with the developing countries  • 
• 
Without going into the somewhat  academic question as to what  share the 
European Community  has had in this developnent,  there is no  dezzyi.ng  that 
without the EC  it would not  have been possible to achieve either the internal 
or the external successes which  I  have  just describedo 
No  single state would have been able to have as much  weight  and influence 
vis-A-vis the outside world - from  the economic  and  political viewpoints -
as the Community  as an entity. 
This is particularly true of the Federal Republic with its ltrong involvement 
in foreign trade and Pa3Dlents  and  the fact that its starting point as regards 
policy is, in many  respects,  singular. 
"'  The  Community's decision-making processes and  ins~itutions, too,  have proven 
useful and  capable,  in any case  in so far as those involved have been 
meticulous and  honest in observing both the spirit and the letter of the 
Rome  'lreaties.  If it a;ppea.rs  todq that the  Community is less able to take 
the strain and more  prone to crises,  then this is becanse  a  few shifts of 
power have crept into its domestic  affairs and  into the interpla;y between the 
Community  institutions - and this needs correcting.  The  core institutions -
the Parliament,  Court  of Justice and  Commission  - have  suffered a  loss of 
influence which is unduly hindering the development  of the whole  Community, 
and it is the centrifugal institutions that have benefited - that is the 
Council of Ministers and the Permanent Representatives Committee plus the 
body for which there was  not  even  a:ny provision in the 'lreaty,  the European 
Council of Heads  of state and Government. -7-
This shi:rt of power has meant  that what  the founders of the  ~eaties 
wanted to avoid at  any price has become  the rule, l!lallely the tendency 
at all diplomatic conferences to level everything down  to the lowest 
common  denominatoro  For example,  when  the European Council takes on a  problem 
of average importance,  such as fisheries,  but does not manage  to solve it then 
the repercussions of its failure go  far beyond the realm of fisheries.  The 
loss of faith in the capability of the European institutions to take any 
action has  an effect on all aspects of integration: 
on the economy,  where it is necessary to know  when  deciding on investments 
whether the success of the policy of economic  unity can still be relied upon; 
but  above all 
- on the army of thousands of experts and  their working parties which make  it 
so difficult to follow the dq-to-dstr progress of integration. 
Meanwhile,  they are given the task of identifying the difficulties of solving 
a  problem,  but are not required to prepare the sol'!ltions.  Weak  governments try 
to pass the necessary adjustments on to their partners in order tit>  avoid taking 
the political responsibility for the chaiJges  in their own  Member  State. 
If they cannot get their own  WSJ"  they prefer to leave the outstanding decisions 
on ice for years - and  are helped in this by the practice of unanimity. • 
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BD.t  even when  a  few  experts set about  seeking Ellropean solutions in a 
constructive spirit of compromise their political backing from  home  is 
wi thdratm or their readiness to compromise is classed cus  weakness. 
Our  hopes for  a  change in this practice are directed first and  foremost  at 
the Parliament.  However,  the European Council will also have to admit  that 
the only wa;;- of overcoming the present crisis of leadership and counteracting 
the growing mistrust is to take co:r::wincing  decisions instead of merely 
issuing communiques  full of niceties.  The  Ru.ropean Council hcus  had this 
effect mainly because,  by its very existence, it has pushed the Council of 
Ministers - the hitherto "ultimate authority" - down  a  l'Ullg•  I  would  even go 
so far as to  s~  that the quite considerable bulk of outstanding decisions, 
pending before the Council,  could be despatched in one hundred working d~ 
if only there still reigned the common  will and capacity to act  and take 
decisions  and  the readiness to compromise based on the European convictions 
that were the order of the dq from  19 56  to 1964• - 9-
Why  can we  not get back to that situation?  What  is stopping us? 
There  are no  fewer chailenges than there were then - just look at Afghanistan, 
Poland and the difficult economic  problems facing us. 
One  development  that has contributed to this  st~tion ot EUropean feeling, 
and  which wa.s  unknown in the period 19.56-641  must  not be overlooked. 
I  mean  the unsatisfactory wq in which the  enlargement  negotiatioll8 have been 
conducted.  They have placed a  burden on the Community  because it appeared 
politically and tactically necessary to find expedient solutions and so the 
negotiations were  limited to ensuring the minimum  degree of conformit7 with 
the Treaties  a.nd  secondary legislation, while nearly all the practical problems 
have been put off to be dealt with later.  The  result has been a  decade of 
hovering crises over  subsequent negotiations  on the Treaties,  only one  example 
of which were the "renegotiations" under  Wilson,  and in which the still unsolved 
problem of the British contribution to the budget represents a  millstone, 
which is holding back the development  of the CollllllUil,ity.  It is not  1113'  intention 
here,  nor indeed is it my  job, to  l~  the blame on anyone.  My European 
self-critical presentation of the problem is levelled at all those who  have 
contributed in a;ny  wq1  within a  kind of broad European coalition, to the 
unification process since the fifties. • 
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Even  tod~ there is no  real alternative to the Treaties of Rome,  nor 
is there any real hope  or even  sufficient reason for a  basic revision 
of them  in order to evolve  a  more  efficient integration policy.  The 
provisions of the Treaties of Rome  are  much  more  flexible and open, 
precisely where  dynamic policies are  concerned,  than their critics 
know  or would  have  them be.  The  economic unification of Europe.requires 
nGt  so  much  blueprints and  elaborate  organizations as competent negotiators 
and  decision-makers in the Member  States.  It is not  the norms  of 
the European  constitution that are ailing;  there is a  hitch in the 
constitutional policy that  should be  applying them. 
Happily,  this year,  at the  instigation of Mr  Genscher,  exploratory 
talks about  the constitution of the European Union  are to be  started 
up  again and  due  attention is to be given to the field of security this 
time.  This  can but help promote  the  convergence  of foreign and defence 
policy with economic  policy.  The  connecting and binding objective 
of both fields is that "finalite politique", that idea of a  unified, 
free,  humane  and democratic Europe  which,  as a  historical fact  and 
the  power  responsible for peace,  can  set an example  in a  world of 
increasing interdependence,  and  which  must  set that  example if it is 
to assert itself. • 
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It follows that the European  Community  must  bear equal responsibility 
and not be either above  or below the institutiops and organizations that 
will emerge  from the,  I  hope  successful,  talks about European Union. 
Anything  t~t is added must  complement  the existing European set-up 
and not try to•s~pplant it.  There  must  be no  new  institutions superimposed 
upon  the European Community  nor any that can be used as a  pretext 
for watering down  the  "acquis communautaire". 
Alongside  such matters of political life and death,  which have  always 
accompanied  the  Community  in one  form  or another,  what  require our 
attention above all are the problems with economic  policy in the present 
situation. 
The  core of the internal market is the  Customs  Union.  The  accelerated 
dismantling of internal market barriers,  often anticipated by the economy, 
was  ~reason for the  Community's great successes in the sixties. 
This successs story is now  liable to come  to an end in a  wave  of 
intentional, internal protectionism,  accepted by those  who  are indifferent 
to the  Community. - 12-
What  is it all about? 
From  the point of view of economic  policy, Europe  is going through 
a  recession. 
The  consequences of the two  oil crises in 1974  and 1979  have not 
yet been  overcome.  The  objectives of trade  cycle policy are seen to 
be inappropriate everywhere.  We  have  8.3 million unemployed at the 
moment  and  there is nothing to say that there will not be  ten million 
unemployed  next winter if the situation deteriorates - the OECD 
refers to 18  to 20  million.  To  complete  the picture,  there is rate 
of inflation running at 12%  and  a  European  current account deficit 
of  some  j45 000  M for 1981. 
Add  to this the unsatisfactory growth  prospects,  a  drop in competitivity 
and  an inadequate increase in productivity.  Everything is made  more 
difficult by the fact that the public authorities in some  Member  States 
are in a  state of total disruption and here the net new  indebtedness 
for 1981  is as high as 10%  of gross national product,  the  Community 
average being 4%. 
In view of this situation the structural challenges and burdens 
weigh  particularly heavily. 
I  am  referring here to: 
the need to speed up  adjustment  in the energy sector; - 13-
taking up  the Japanese  challenge  tod~ and that of the 
United States tomorrow; 
the structural consequences of coming to terms with the newlr 
industrializing countries of the third world. 
The  fact that public opinion is hardly prepared for such a  situation 
is a  constan~ temptation for weak-willed governments to seek salvation 
in short-term beggar-my-neighbour policy and protectionist measures. 
All the means  imaginable to achieve  market isolation, be it to gain 
only a  few  months'  breathing space,  can be  seen more  and more  frequently 
nowadays  as the aims of sometimes brazen administrative protectionism 
within the  Community;  the  GATT  has  complained about  the fact that 
non-tariff barriers to trade  on  a  world scale have  become  more  frequent 
than ever before. 
The  Community's essential instrument to fight this temptation is the 
logical application of Article  30,  which provides us with ample 
opportunities of counteracting "measures having equivalent effect", 
and as limited an application as possible of Article 115,  which irrespective 
of its effect on  the outside world also provides a  variety of 
pretexts for reintroducing administrative barriers within the  Community. - 14-
Another starting point for protectionism is to be found  in, the 
temptation to provide direct or indirect subsidies for actual or supposed 
lame  ducks,  or in the attempt to engage  the Finance Ministers in 
a  race - as long as  they are still capable of running. 
The  parliamentary accompaniment  to such  temptations is - in European 
terms - rather discordant.  It is characterized by demands  for national 
go-it-alone policies and by the absurd assumption that the essential 
aim of European unification is to make  any further structural change 
superfluous- in any  case  the  constituency  concerned. 
If these undeniably enormous  difficulties were  regarded in an attacking 
and  dynamic  manner it would  be natural, because of the crisis, to 
bring European  trade  cycle policy,  which is coordinated only in studies, 
more  quickly than before under overall control.  Such a  step would 
be  desirable if only to prevent the European internal market,  which 
has been  conceived along liberal lines, from  falling apart during the 
1981  recession,  as did the likewise liberal world trade set-up -
definitively- during the 1930-33 crisis. - 15-
So  why  is it that the European  Community  has not got any further 
with the harmonization and  alignment  of its Member  States•  economic 
policies in spite of the fact that there has  been  constant talk of 
it for over a  decade? 
Apart from  the inertia of national bureaucracies, which  find things 
easier when  confronted with a  weak  government, it is quite clear that 
what  has contributed to this erroneous trend is that there is in 
the  Community  no  alignment  of that which is described in Germany  as 
"Ordnungspoli  tik" or policy on  the general organization of the economy 
- a  difficult concept to translate.  Now  it is up  to us to work  out 
the most  suitable European economic  system,  given the most  disparate 
ideas of the large European parties, pressure groups and governments. 
From  left-wing socialism to traces of Manchester liberalism there is 
every kind of political, regulative  concept and practice in the 
Member  States.  Therefore the European  Community  is, unfortunately, 
a  long way  from  thinking within a  single set·  of political  ~views, from 
reasoning along the  same  lines and,  above  all, from  acting. 
The  present confusion begins with the fact that there is widespread 
ignorance of the political framework  and basic regulations of the  EEC 
Treaty. 
• ---- -- -- -----------------------~-~--~-----
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The  economic  core of the European  Community  is a  common~rket ~thout 
internal frontiers in which mobility of the factors of production :  -
based on  the four freedoms  - free movement  of persons and goods,  freedom 
to provide services and  freedom of establiShment - is intended to ensure 
optimum  utilization of natural location, this being the prerequisite 
for a  European  econoay  b~sed on  the division of labour.  Competition 
between firms  on  the basis of efficiency is expressly included in the 
rules laid down  in the Treaty,  and  a  ban on  unauthorized aids and 
subsidies and  the equipping of the  Community  with the necessary instruments 
to combat  internal protectionism and harmonize  any legislation which 
- were it to be  maintained - would  act as a  barrier to trade complete 
this European  concept.  It is just as sound today as it ever was,  and 
there is no  alternative.  For only with the aid of the market  mechanism 
is it possible to ensure an  optimum  allocation of resources in the 
interests of the consumers,  and that means  all the citizens of Europe. 
A European state economy  at Community  level,  a  sort of European  collectivism, 
would not be an alternative, as is shown  by the example  of Comecon. 
The  history of Comecon  serves precisely to show  that even a  far from 
squeamish  superpower does not dare  to incorporate the East European 
economies in its planning system by force and  reduce  them to the level 
of provinces of the Soviet Union. - 17-
Any  such experiment  involving the homogeneous  partner states of 
the European  Community  would be even less likely to succeed.  These 
considerations are not merely academic and  were  real enough  during the 
years of the discussion on  Eurooommunism.  However,  even a  perfect 
centrally controlled econo~ on  a  national basis would be  irreconcilable 
with the  system of the  ~opean internal market. 
A centrally controlled economic  system functions only when  the 
quantitative controls are introduced at its frontiers on  the movement 
of goods,  money,  capital,  services,  workers  and  businessmen;  otherwise, 
its control instruments would  always be  rendered ineffectual by its 
open frontiers.  The  re-establishment  of frontiers would  amount  to 
the abandonment  of the European  Community. 
Nevertheless,  as things are today we  are already in a  grey area as far 
as policy on  the general organization of the economy  is concerned; 
I  will deal with this under three headings: 
1.  nationalization or transfer to State ownership  of major undertakings; 
2.  the  "mixed  economy"  as the norm,  and 
3.  a  falsified industrial policy that is misused as a  pretext for intervention. ''  -' ,_-, '---------------------------
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Re  Point 1 
It is correct to say that Article  222  of the EEC  Treaty leaves the 
rules governing the system of property ownership untouched.  Nor  can 
it be disputed,  however,  that as a  result of the use  of the instrument 
of nationalization in the field of services and marketable goods 
the possibility can arise of large-scale distortions of competition 
at the expense  of private firms in all the other Member  States.  It 
is open  to doubt  whether the principle laid down  in Article 90, 
namely that  ~ationalized undertakings and private firms should by and 
large be  treated in the  same  way,  is really suitable given the 
conditions referred to therein to provide adequate protection against 
this danger.  As  regards  the  scope  of this provision, there is as you 
know  a  case still pending before the European  Court  of Justice in 
which  a  number  of Member  States are disputing whether the Commission 
has interpreted that Article correctly. 
Since the nationalization of the Italian electricity industry- the 
so-called ENEL  case - there has been an academic discussion in the 
Community  on  this matter.  In my  opinion it is time to take another 
thorough look at the usefulness of the nationalization formula.  The 
case of steel should have  provided some  food for thought.  According 
to plausible calculations,  some  DM  60  000  M has been paid out in 
subsidies or has been formally promised for the period 1975-83 in just 
four Member  States, without  there being any guarantee that the steel 
industries of those  four Member  States will really be competitive 
and able to hold their own  on  the world market  when  the subsidies 
come  to an end. 
• - 19  -
It is extremely interesting that  70%  of these highly subsidized steel 
undertakings are wholly' or  predominantly under state ownership.  These 
Member  States must  therefore take the major responsibility for what  is 
probably the greatest waste of resources in peace time that we  have  ever 
seen.  An  economic  policy on this pattern, if extended to other branches, 
would  be  bound to lead to the economic  ruin not  only of the Member  States 
but  also of the whole  Community.  The  drain on the taxpayers that is the 
necessary result of this course of action is not  socially fair,  economically 
sensible or politically justifiable.  Other  experience with nationalized 
industries in Italy,  Great  Britain and  France points in the same  direction. 
Should not  these  examples  suffice to make  us ask - irrespective of ideology -
whether it would  not  be  in the interests of every European citizen,  above 
all the workers,  to cast nationalization once and  for all on the scrap heap 
of spurious  economic  solutions.  At  least then the present crisis would  have 
had  ~positive result.  Anyone  still hesitating should consider the fact 
that neither Japan nor  the United States,  our two  major challengers,  have 
the slightest respect for  such state-ownership recipes. - 20-
The  effects on the development  and  ability of the Community  to fUnction 
are perfectly obvious:  let us  just suppose that all the production and 
service undertakings in a  Member  State were  nationalized,  leading in effect 
to the creation of the economic  conditions of a  centrally controlled  econo~. 
A fully nationalized national banking system with whioh it would  be  possible 
to prevent the financing of· the purchase of plant,  equipment  or investments 
in other Member  States would  be  bound·to lead to incalculable distortions 
and  falsifications of competition.  Any  such testing of how  much  the 
Community  system could stand might  easily lead to its destruction. 
Re  Point  2 
There is little to object to in the concept  of the "mixed  economy" if it 
is merely used to describe the present  situation of an increasing expansion 
of the public sector.  It is one  of economic  policy's instruments of 
diagnosis.  It does  become  more  questionable,  however,  when  there is a 
sudden transition away  from  the description of a  regrettable state of 
affairs to that of a  desired objective, i.e. a  European norm,  or when  an 
attempt  is sometimes  made  to argue that the Member  States are required to 
change  the organization of their economies if a  more  coherent European  policy  . 
is to evolve. - 21  -
Even today,  the average figure for the state share of the national product 
in the Community  is 47%,  compared with  32%  at the beginning of the 60's. 
The  Federal Republic is no  exception here and  the trend in Germ~ has 
followed the above rate of increase almost  exactly.  This is an extension 
of the public sector at the expense of the private which cannot  be viewed 
too seriously. 
Re  point  3 
The  third aspect  of the grey area of politicized and  interventionist state 
action can be  linked to an erroneous  interpretation of the concept  of 
industrial policy. 
The  Rome  Treaties do  not  use this term.  After its establishment, it took 
the Commission ten years and  some  difficulty to obtain responsibility in 
this field.  Since the Federal Republic is the only st'ate that has  no 
national ministry whose  actual title assigns it responsibility for  industrial 
· policy,  some  transposition of the different concepts of our partners might 
first of all be necessary to achieve mutual understanding.  ,  . - 22-
We  must  observe,  however,  that states that assign responsibility for 
industrial policy on  a  more  comprehensive  basis pick up the game  of 
administrative protectionism much  more  thoroughly than do  others. 
Customs  posts are closed down- ostensibly for reasons of rationalization -
for a  number  of particularly "sensitive" products;  certificates of origin 
are demanded  even when  there is no  legal basis for this;  labelling 
regulations are invented supposedly for reasons of consumer  protection; 
standards are manipulated;  the Community  is bypassed in external negotiations 
conducted under the heading of "cooperation",  and  wherever  possible distortions 
of competition are organized and  camouflaged with the aid of state-owned 
banks.  The  flow of investment  is directed and  even public procurement  policy 
is used as  a  means  to an end.  ''Buy British" or "achetez fran9ais" campaigns 
are still conducted  without  adequate Community  sanctions and  businessmen 
and their trade associations, which  become  increasingly used to these 
strategies,  approach "their industry ministry" ever more  vigorously to 
perfect their protection still further,  complete their isolation and in 
this way  avoid any structural change. -~-
Recently,  the Commission  has  been swamped  with complaints in this field. 
The  Commission will look into every individual complaint  and will take 
action,  conscious of its responsibility for the integrity of the internal 
market  and  the "aquis communautaire". 
This means  that we  must  take determined action against this trend and that 
we  must  not hesitate if necessary to ignore national or individual sensitivities 
and call in the Court  of Justice - a  step that has  already been taken in a 
considerable number  of cases. 
In my  opinion, it should by  no  means  be  seen as a  bad  thing if the Court  of 
Justice has  been developing more  and  more  recently into the decisive force 
for the implementation of the integration process.  For  Community  law is 
evolutionary and,  particularly in this grey area,  requires continuous 
interpretation and  further development. ------------------------
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I  don't need to point  out  to a  German  audience how  important this development 
is bound to be  in a  few  years' time for  overall economic  efficiency.  One 
can argue about the details of the drastic cure which Prime Minister Thatcher 
has  been forced to apply over the last couple of years in Great Britain but 
there is no  questioning the fact that without  the decades  of intervention-happy 
industrial policy pursued  b,y  previous British Governments  the English cart 
would  not  have  got  so deep into the mud.  The  main price has  been paid by 
British workers whose  real income  tod~ is perhaps  some  6o%  of the level of 
their German  counterparts despite the fact that in the late 50's they were 
at more  or less the same  level.  Nor  is it any comfort  to report that these 
industrial policy mistakes tend to be concentrated in areas in need of 
restructuring.  The  number  of projects to  promote  the industries and 
technologies of the future that  have  come  to grief in Western Europe in 
the period since the war  is also considerable and the billions that have 
thus  been lost have  never really been counted.  The  politicizing of development 
and  investment decisions has  seldom  brought  any  joy and the number  of failures 
would  seem  to leave no  room  for  doubt. -~-
In view of the economic  and political risks that can be  linked with an 
industrial policy conceived on an interventionist or protectionist basis, 
it seems  to me  to be  particularly important  for the Community  to avoid the 
repetition at Community  level - only on a  greater scale - of these national 
failures and  aberrations. 
There is no  doubt  about  the industrial policy responsibility given to the 
Community  in the matter of steel under the ECSC.  This is, however,  an 
exceptional measure  for  both political and  historical reasons.  Without  the 
historical and  political background of the ECSC  no  special provisions  on 
steel would  have  been included in the EEC  Treaty.  This  exceptional measure 
will apply up to the year  2002  when  the 50-year period of the ECSC  Treaty 
will expire.  Before we  reach that date,  we  still have  a  good  deal of time 
to think about  the organizational incorporation of internal and  external 
responsibilities for  the steel sector in the EEC  Treaty and  its position 
from  the viewpoint  of policy on  the regulation of the economy. - 26-
As  far as  other sectors are concerned,  the question arises of the proper 
delimitation of direct and  indirect promotion of research at Community  level. 
This is also of significance from  the industrial policy viewpoint.  It is 
the task of industrial policy in particular to monitor  economic  development 
to see whether there are relevant  questions  for practical basic research, 
but  without  encroaching on  the autonomy  of the firms which are alone 
responsible for their action. 
What  it boils down  to in practical terms is to ensure that the Community 
neither promotes  the renationalization of the internal market  nor replaces 
a  failed national interventionism with a  European version of the same. 
The  increased role of the state has  also contributed in another  connection 
to the undermining of the internal market.  I  am  referring to the increasing 
tendency of all the Member  States to adopt  a  series of separate legislative 
measures  to deal with questions  of economic  relevance. - 27-
I  am  referring here to the numerous  occasions in recent yea.ra vhen 
Member  States have gone it alone with national legislation - aometiaea 
without any coordination with the Community- on  the pretext of 
overriding objectives such as protection of the environment,  safety 
at work  and  consumer  or-health protection.  The  consequence of this 
profusion of legislative measures is a  fragmentation of the single 
market  for every part sector thus dealt with,  whether as a  result of 
special standards,  arbitrary approval  regulations or the like. 
Anyone  passing a  national lead-in-petrol law, is refusing market 
access to the refineries of other states and  is destroying the internal 
market for that product.  Anyone  introducing environmental protection 
standards not  coordinated with the other Member  States is denying 
market  access to other products and,  in industrial policy terms, is 
throwing away  his own  sales opportunities on  the European or world 
market. 
This trend cannot  continue unhindered.  A general political ban on 
national go-it-alone legislation without prior consultations with the 
Canmunity is long overdue.  In the long run,  we  must a.ftticipate the 
problem by adopting relevant Community  legislation;  this would  be 
far more  rational than any attempt at subsequent harmonization. 
/ .  <· 
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The  sum  total of these developments in internal trade can only confirm 
the conviction that the European internal market must be recaptured. 
This requires above all a  psychological  change. 
If confidence in the dismantling of barriers cannot be restoril41 it 
will be impossible to count  on  the readiness to invest that is 
necessar,y to meet  the world  economic  challenge from Japan,  the USA 
and the newly industrializing countries.  Without  a  dramatic 
reversal  ~f direction, without  an immediate internal market programme 
involving a  high degree of political commitment  on  the part of 
the European governments it will be impossible to achieve this change, 
a  change  ~hich is all the easier as it would generate no costs for 
the hard-pressed national budgets but would rather provide additional 
investment incentives for our industry,  which is in dire need of 
them. 
It is no longer enough to concentrate on  curing symptoms  or to 
quarrel about the details of originating products or similar 
manifestations of industrial and trade policy; routine;  it is now 
a  question of restoring the dynamism  of the development  of the internal 
market  and making it a  usable instrument to OYercom.e  Europe's 
difficulties  • ~- ~-- -~-- --~------------------
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What  I  have said regarding the increasing dangers  of protection!  .. 
within the Community naturally also applies to external trade,  as 
is illustrated by the most recent report  :f't-Oit  the GAilT.  The  most 
sensitive sectors - textiles,  shipbuilding,  agriculture,  steel -
are significantly those in which there have been shifts of 
comparative cost advantages in favour of producers in other regions 
or parts of the world which  even a  decade ago played little role 
in these markets.  Outside as within the Community,  protectionism 
flourishes where the logical adjustments to market and production 
condi  tiona are not carried out and where no allowance is made  for 
structural changes.  Understandable as the social and political 
resistance to painful processes of adjustment mey  be, the costs of 
protectionism are borne in the final analysis by the economic 
itself in the form  of economic  inefficiency and loss of growth. 
A topical  example of this is the effect of the protective measures 
and excessive subsidies for a  non-competitive steel industr,r in a 
number  of European countries on  the overall tax burden and thus 
on  the industrial cost situation in those countries. . t 
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In the end,  the problems of this industrial sector have been 
shifted on  to other sectors,  only in the form  of social costs. 
The  rate of increase in world trade has practically halved 
compared  with the levels achieved in the sixties and  early seventies. 
It seems,  too,  that it will be difficult in the short term to 
maintain even that value.  The  current account  situation and  the 
diminishing creditworthiness of many  non-oil-producing developing 
countries. is giving grounds for concern.  Even  now  we  are clearly 
feeling the intensification of international competition in virtually 
every  are~ of the export trade.  The  Community  now  has a  current 
account  d~ficit of ~ 45  000 M compared  with a  surplus in Japan of 
~ 11  000 
1M and in the United States of ~ 25  000  M. 
At  the ver,y least, it remains to be seen whether,  given the present 
overall  economic  conditions following the two  as yet undigested oil 
crises, the so-called export  locomotive - which in comparable 
situations has alweys been able to pull the econany  out of trouble -
can do  that once  again  • - 31-
In connection with the consequences for the world  econ~ of the 
energ:r crises and the structural shifts there has been much  talk 
in recent years of the new  international  economic  order.  I  cannot 
cover this complex subject properly here.  Let me  just 8~  that 
its points of departure seem unsatisfactory and above all inconsistent. 
Not  enough account is taken of the basic interests of the developing 
countries in an efficient world  economy based on  the division of 
labour or in the possibilities for choice that only efficient 
markets can offer.  Any shift of decision-mald.ng awa.Y  from the market 
into bi- or multilateral political bodies means  increased economic 
and thereby also political dependence for the weakest developing 
countri~a on their more  powerfUl partners. 
Their group recently pointed out,  and rightly, that investment 
by the industrialized countries in the developing countries can 
flourish only in a  climate based on  the market  economy.  Given 
the unqualified discussions  on  industrialized country investment 
in the developing countries in connection with the search for a  new 
international economic  order, it is therefore not surprising that 
German  direct investment in the developing countries declined in  . 
just three years,  from  1976  to 1979,  from  38%  to 14%• - 32-
' 
The  figure~ for other Member  States are to same  extent comparable. 
No-one  can: fail to be aware of the food for thought provided by 
the Brandt Commission report.  Our attention, however,  is concentrated 
more  on  the questions it raises than on its answers,  which in many 
cases will not stand up to the in-depth international discussion 
they have generated.  It simply won't do  to add up the industrialized 
states  •  expenditure on  armaments  and then paint  a.  picture of the 
world tha.t ·assumes that this expenditure can be devoted within a. 
foreseeable time to development-aid.  It is more logical to look 
into the cq.uses  of excessive arms  expenditure and to seq how  these 
causes could be removed.  This applies equally to the arms  race 
launched by the Soviet Union and to the arms  procurement  efforts 
of the dev~loping countries who,  in the a.bseace  of a  workable 
interna.tio~ order,  feel  obliged to protect themselves from their 
neighbQlll's~ 
I  now  come  i,to  my  conclusion. - 33-
The  efficiency and reliability of the European internal market 
and the liberal European  external trade policy are key elements 
for the solution of the European Community's present serious 
problems.  Without access free from  hindrance or discrimination 
to the sources of supply and sales markets of the world economy 
the European Community,  which is so dependent  on external trade, 
will not be able to pursue a  successful  economic policy.  On 
top of this there is our unchanged and disturbing dependence  on 
imported oil.  This is a  source of concern not  only for reasons 
of security of supply, and because of our dependence  on price 
decisions motivated solely by political considerations, but above 
all because of the connection with the balance-of-payments deficits 
and thus the external value of the currencies of the European 
countries whose  economies have not  done  enough up to now  to tackle 
the oil supply problem.  In view of the long lead times tor the 
restructuring of oil supply away  from  oil we  are looking here a.t 
the exposed flank of European economic policy. -34-
The  mul  tifar~ous problems that are emerging at national and 
European level will be soluble only if the responsibl.e' clemooratic 
I 
forces in a  'umber of Member  States decide on  a  change in their 
behaviour in keeping with the seriousness of the present moment, 
that means  a .lasting increase in the ability of the European 
' 
Governments  ~o take action. 
But: 
no European decision-making process can make  up for national 
weaknesses.  :The  problems  of European integration can therefore 
be solved only if the right conditions for this are created at 
I 
national  lev~l.  It is, therefore, the responsibility of every 
' 
European to ensure that  even this critical phase is used to good 
purpose and ;o ensure that in the  end  even this crisis will prove 
to have been beneficial. 
! 